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Burden Sharing in Refugee Law 
Eddie Bruce-Jones1 
 
 
This chapter outlines out some of the ways in which the concept of ‘burden sharing’ 
has been considered within international refugee law.  As it would be misleading to 
insist on too rigid a genealogy of the term ‘burden sharing’, given the far-reaching 
potential for application of such a concept within international refugee law theory 
and practice, the first section identifies the defining ways in which the concept is 
used.  The second section critically interrogates the logics that underlie the 
commonplace notion of ‘the burden’ of burden sharing and postulates a different 
framework for understanding the concept. 
 
Burden sharing -  the main debates 
 
Both legal scholarship and policy analysis on contemporary challenges in refugee law 
have incorporated, explicitly and implicitly, what has come to be known as the 
concept of burden sharing.  While burden sharing is not a terribly stable term, it has 
featured explicitly in policy debates on issues ranging from climate change (see e.g., 
Ringius, et. al., 2002) to international military defense campaigns (see e.g., Sandler 
and Forbes, 1980).  In its most general sense, burden sharing can be thought of as 
international co-operation for the purpose of sharing the costs or, with a more 
ethics-based charge, responsibility for a common task.  However, its deployment as a 
term of art within refugee law has been concisely described by Astri Suhrke, who 
notes that early proposals for international cooperation on refugee law by Grahl- 
Madsen in 1983 and Hathaway and Neve in 1997 called for collective action that 
would “strengthen the protection for refugees by reducing inequities among 
recipient states. (Suhrke, 1998: 397).  Other proposals that we might refer to under 
the rubric of burden sharing have developed in the same context as interventions by 
Grahl-Madesn, Hathaway and Neve, in the form of UNHCR resettlement schemes 
and similar interment schemes, which Suhrke refers to as sharing schemes (ibid: 
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397–398).  Important to all of these schemes is the dual purpose that Suhrke 
identifies—to establishing the financial fairness and feasibility for receiving states to 
accept and, importantly, agree to accept refugees as a means to guaranteeing the 
proper functioning and humanitarian commitments of the refugee and asylum 
system. 
 
Aspects of this core logic of burden sharing are pervasive in regional and 
international refugee law policy and practice.  Notably, notions of the “burden” and 
the parameters of sharing it are contingent upon context and political purpose.   
Despite this, there are a few main aspects of the debates on the term ‘burden 
sharing’ that should feature in any summary of its contemporary usage.   
 
i. Burden sharing as legal obligation 
 
In a most general way, the idea of burden sharing in the context of refugee law can 
be understood as having a long trajectory in international law, linked to early calls 
for the co-ordination of the administrative, infrastructural and other costs borne by 
receiving states in their admission of refugees from abroad.  The logic of burden 
sharing has featured within the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNCHR) system since its establishment in the 1950s, even if the term has not.  This 
logic can be identified in the “task of persuading states to cooperate in the pursuit of 
refugee protection and durable solutions.” (Betts, Loescher and Milner 2012: 2).  In 
its preamble, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter: 
Refugee Convention) contains language that urges states to cooperate in order to 
alleviate the “unduly heavy burdens” that certain states may assume when fulfilling 
their international obligations to take in asylum applicants.  At the time it was 
written, the Refugee Convention was intended to respond to refugee migration 
owing to events that occurred following the two world wars (Betts, Loescher and 
Milner 2012: 8-9), reference to which was included in the original definition of the 
“refugee” before it was amended by protocol in the 1960s.2 Juss points out that the 
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early conception of refugee protection was inwardly focused, orientated towards 
regional protection that took account of cultural likeness (Juss 2006: 231–33).  He 
recounts the dangers of using cultural difference as a factor in granting asylum and, 
despite its being amended, he suggests that the international regime of refugee 
protection continues to programmatically exclude groups along the lines of culture 
and race (ibid).  The post-amendment formulation of the Refugee Convention, along 
with the harmonization of European Union policies on migration and asylum, has 
marked a shift, in contemporary Europe, from a focus on Europe’s internal borders 
to increased resource and investment in Europe’s external border.  Burden sharing is 
now discussed with emphasis on the need for EU member states to share the costs 
of migration experienced most directly by states at the external border of the 
European Union, particularly along the Mediterranean Sea.   
 
Goodwin-Gill and McAdam emphasise that while a general principle of cooperation 
exists in international law to encourage interstate cooperation in assisting or 
managing the movement of people across borders, such a principle does not imply a 
positive legal obligation to do so (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007: 502).3  
Furthermore, international refugee law, insofar as it creates obligations or 
expectations to uniformly distribute the costs of refugee migration, are ineffective 
due to lack of compliance (Betts and Collier 2017: 208–9).  Betts and Collier cite the 
European Union’s Common Asylum Policy as disastrous with respect to the 
distribution of the costs of asylum across its member states, leaving a handful of 
member states with a disproportionate amount of responsibility, which undercut the 
common standards envisioned by European Union legislation (ibid: 211). 
 
ii.  Burden Sharing as a discourse of marketisation 
 
In what has become a key text on burden sharing, Hathaway and Neve establish that 
refugee protection should be of a temporary nature, in order to reduce overall costs 
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associated with long-term migration particularly to states that receive large numbers 
of refugees and externally displaced people (Hathaway and Neve 1997: 152–53).  
This limitation on protection operates as a concession to states, on the presumption 
that states are so invested in the relative proportionality of any migration-related 
increases in population and corresponding costs that, if this proportionality is 
compromised, they might not offer protection.  This particular rationale seems 
unreliable as a rule, inasmuch as there are already great disparities in the numbers 
of refugees accepted by European Union countries, and although the costs of 
accepting refugees is not borne evenly, countries have not wholesale withdrawn 
from the regimes of protection.  However, market reasoning is a most centrally 
operant paradigm, particularly in the European context of burden sharing. Some 
countries on the Mediterranean border of the European Union, which have high 
costs in terms of the management and infrastructural expenditure for receiving large 
numbers of refugees, have at times not been willing or able to maintain standards of 
protection that also uphold basic human rights (M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, ECtHR 
2011).  Additionally, any analysis of the costs of protection must be weighed against 
the benefits, and it is difficult to measure the positive effects on states’ legitimacy 
that is essentially purchased when individual states agree to take in refugees in 
fulfillment of their humanitarian obligations under international law or the impact 
(or lack thereof) of programmatic offloading of responsibility on other states in 
return for financial sums (see Juss 2006: 233).  Juss also points out that, “given the 
North’s history of unilaterally and improperly off-loading most of its refugee 
obligations onto the South’, there is no reason to believe that the pragmatic market 
analysis of North-North burden sharing will change the global dynamic of refugee 
migration and state responses.  According to Betts and Collier, almost 90% of the 
worlds refugees are in the developing world, and more than 100 times the financial 
support of each refugee in the North is afforded to each refugee in the global South 
(2017: 3). 
 
iii. Burden sharing as border securitisation 
 
A third aspect of burden sharing in contemporary international refugee law is its 
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focus on the co-operation for the purposes of integrating refugee protection into the 
operant border control, including national and international mandates for peace and 
security. The discourse of co-operation for the purpose of greater border security is 
used in Europe, for example, as a way to ensure a large degree of free movement for 
citizens and certain legal residents within the borders of the Schengen Area.  
Consolidated resources and attention on the EU’s external border has, not un-
controversially, been thought of as a necessary element of EU citizens’ rights to free 
movement.  Collective refugee policies in Europe have shifted from protection to 
containment of refugee migration (Hurwitz 2010). 
 
Goodwin-Gill and McAdam cite the peculiar example of the Cotonou Agreement, the 
result of a partnership between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries aimed partly at normalizing the movement of refugees and regulating 
undocumented immigration, return and readmission has constituted, by some 
accounts, “the penalization of emigration, contrary to article 13(1) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights” (original emphasis)(ibid: 504).  In other words, a 
practical reality of state co-operation on management of movement is that co-
operation itself is not necessarily one of legal obligation but political and financial 
expedience, and that this co-operation is sometimes oriented towards the slowing of 
migration as opposed to the accommodation of movement. Similarly, some argue 
that the Khartoum Process, an agreement between the African Union Commission 
and European Commission that increases interstate co-operation with the aim of 
combating irregular migration to Europe, fails to attend to the “need for legal 
migration channels”, thereby restricting freedom of movement in a most crucial 
time.4  A further example of this is the EU agreement with Libya aimed at preventing 
the passage of migrants across the Mediterranean into Europe, which has, according 
to leading academics and activists, created a condition of extreme danger for 
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refugees, with devastating and fatal consequences.5 
 
iv. Burden sharing as crisis management 
 
Conversations about the nature of burden sharing have been rekindled in the 
European context in the midst of increased numbers of refugees entering Europe in 
what has been dubbed in Europe a ‘refugee crisis.’  In a commentary on the EU 
Council of Foreign Relations, commentator Susi Dennison argues that, going forward, 
European Union member states will need to consider the ‘burden’ of burden sharing 
to be more than simply the size of the refugee population taken in by each state, but 
rather other financial and resource-intensive commitments in response to the 
‘crisis,’ including  
 
“financial support and human resources for reception, accommodation and 
integration to external border management; long term overseas aid to 
refugee camps in other regions; scaling up the resettlement of refugees from 
camps in Syria’s neighbouring countries and diplomatic efforts on the sources 
of conflicts that drive refugee flows.” 
 
This broadening of the concept of the burden, whilst it does suggest new layers of 
interstate co-operation on accommodating refugee migration, does not 
fundamentally alter the conventional conception of burden sharing—it continues to 
frame the burden as the net cost of refugee migration to receiving states, in terms of 
capital and other resources, and including the sharpened focus on securing the 
border. 
 
A specific example of burden sharing in this context is a controversial deal that has 
resulted between the EU and Turkey on the resettlement of refugees from Syria.  
The deal, which stipulated that the EU would pay the Turkish government up to €6 
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billion to receive irregular migrants arriving in Greece, has been criticised as 
disregarding the question of whether Turkey is a safe place to resettle refugees in 
such large numbers, on top of the fact that the deal seems to be a type of 
outsourcing of the EU’s international humanitarian obligations towards refugees 
(Amnesty International 2017; see also European Commission 2016).  The deal raises 
the question: what is the cost of burden sharing?  More specifically, if we 
understand that there is a need to distribute and manage the cost of refugee 
migration, how do we understand that cost, and how do we really keep the best 
interests of refugees at the centre of our analysis if the analysis takes place within 
the framework of a market rationale? 
 
The EU-Turkey deal is an example that urges us to think perhaps more critically 
about the nature of the burden of burden sharing, including who ultimately pays the 
debt of burden.   
 
v.  Burden sharing as a commitment to solidarity 
 
In various contexts, the ‘sharing’ of burden sharing is understood to invest 
participants of the sharing in a common project, broadly understood as a form of 
political solidarity.  In the context of refugee law, this can be seen in discussions 
around the Dublin Regulations in EU Law.  The Dublin System, which falls within the 
broader remit of the Common European Asylum System, was conceived to alleviate 
the financial and infrastructural costs of receiving relatively large numbers of asylum 
applicants on European Union Member States along the external border of the EU.  
While some commentators believe the most recent set of reforms to the Dublin 
System to promise more profound change in the way costs and people are 
redistributed from border states to internal states of the EU, mainly by way of a 
mandatory relocation scheme (Van Wolleghem 2018: 4–12), others argue that the 
costs planned to accompany such relocation and, in the case of the European 
Commission’s version of the proposed changes, the high threshold for triggering 
relocation will exacerbate the efforts to equalize the costs incurred by 
accommodating refugees (Young 2017: 372–376).  Debates on the Dublin System 
and the various reforms discussed over the last fifteen years have centered upon 
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principles of equity, though the polices adopted, once refracted through pragmatic 
considerations and the broader panoply of political considerations, have been 
understood to fall short of the aspiration to provide fairness and solidarity between 
EU Member States, to the detriment of those at the borders of the region.  Of 
course, the question of solidarity in this context is primarily one of solidarity 
between states, not necessarily between citizens of Europe and people not (yet) 
regarded as citizens.  
 
The question of solidarity among states points to an inevitable question—one as 
central to the concept of citizenship as it is to the question of the refugee, who is 
excluded from citizenship—to whom is solidarity best paid in the context of refugee 
law?  Further, is the argument for resource-centric state-state solidarity the only or 
most effective form of solidarity with refugees?  
 
 
Critical Perspectives on Burden Sharing 
 
 
“4,000 people per day in the Greek islands is of course a big flow. But the number of 
people displaced by conflict in the world per day last year was 42,500. We now have 
one third of the population in Lebanon that is Palestinian and Syrian; Syrians are one 
fourth of the population. If one looks at other situations in Africa and in other parts of 
the world, we see extremely poor countries that open their borders and provide what 
they have - and even what they do not have - to support people. I will never forget, 
when the Côte d’Ivoire crisis erupted, I went to Liberia to a refugee hosting village. 
And before any international assistance had arrived, the people of that Liberian village 
were giving the refugees coming from Côte d’Ivoire the seeds of rice that they were 
going to use for the next planting season. They were condemning themselves to 
starve, unless international support would be given, just to allow for the refugees to 
survive. This kind of example from very poor people is something that the European 
Union should meditate on - with all the economic problems and difficulties and all the 
crises, by which my own country was also deeply affected, we still live in a privileged 
part of the world. And we have an enormous responsibility when we look around and 
see what is happening today around Europe, knowing that sooner or later, if we do 
not do the right thing, we will pay a heavy price..“   
 
-Antonio Guterres, former UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees, 2015 
 
The former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in an address to the UN, provided a 
window into a possible way of thinking that stokes the fires of the imagination. What 
if burden sharing were thought to be relevant not only at the point of migration, but 
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well before it?  What if receiving states were to understand their obligations, moral 
and otherwise, towards those crossing borders as extending beyond the financial 
and social surplus and into the depths of infrastructure and the core of our 
resources? Guterres recalls an experience in which a receiving community put itself 
at some risk in order to provide life-sustaining protection to an incoming community 
in need, at the risk of paying an even heavier price.  That heavy price, in my 
interpretation of Guterres’ speech, is not only a financial but a moral one.  Failing to 
put refugees and their well-being at the centre of our policies on reception sustains 
the arbitrary taxonomy of human lives, bound up in state thinking and the bordering 
practices of citizenship and racialisation.  The burden, to the extent that we can 
speak of burdens, is not the people who move, nor is it the cost incurred for their 
provisions.  The burden is the border itself, which assaults the material, social and 
political interconnectedness of human beings.  In Guterres’ scenario, the Liberians 
deliberately rejected the distinction that borders imposed, risking starvation to avoid 
moral impoverishment.   While a conventional burden-sharing perspective might 
insist that the Liberian approach was not sustainable, whereas international 
collective action provides a more durable response to refugee migration, the point 
remains that a focus on the costs of migration may detract from the deep-rooted 
damage of border logic, and the failure to identify and combat this damage may 
fatally condemn burden sharing to continue to address the wrong problem. 
 
In thinking through international co-operation for the assistance of people moving 
across borders, combating the heavy weight of border thinking means providing 
assurances that national policies and international co-operation are geared to 
protect, in the first place.  The value for protecting refugees should, accordingly and 
un-controversially, serve as the primary measure of co-operation.  In discussing the 
‘principled limits to temporary protection,’ Hathaway and Neve argue that it should 
not simply become a form of warehousing, as ineffective temporary protection often 
does at present (1997: 119, 181). However, it is difficult to imagine what else it 
would realistically become, if temporary protection, by its very nature, aims at only 
limited political, economic and social integration. To keep newly arrived people 
separate from the labour economy and other facets of social citizenship and 
Pre-publication draft – not for distribution 
participation, is ultimately a form of warehousing. Temporary protection, whilst it 
arguably coaxes states to provide certain forms of relief up-front, would trap 
refugees into lives lived ‘on hold.’  The eventual forced return of migrants to 
countries of origin would threaten to break apart supportive networks and family 
bonds accrued in host countries, which will have, in the meantime, become home 
for these people (Juss 2006: 235–37).  Furthermore, the temporary status of people 
as participants in their new home countries underlines the separation from other 
citizens and residents that they are bound to experience when not afforded the 
opportunity to work and plan futures.  For them, the border, as Balibar argues, is 
reproduced in everyday life (Balibar 2001; see also Walia 2016), which certainly must 
constitute a burden for those on the move. 
 
So, given the violence that takes place in individual receiving states and contours the 
harshness of the lives of refugees—in camps, detention centres and in the everyday 
state of living lives apart, in perpetual hold—one might wonder what international 
co-operation is to look like and who it is meant to serve.  Is it only capable of 
redoubling local inadequacies on a global scale?  My contention is that, unless we 
expand the notion of the burden, the moral and financial debt we have to remedy 
historical geopolitical violence of colonialism and global capitalism, sharing the 
short-term financial costs will simply proliferate and deepen long-term financial and 
moral costs—the ‘heavy price’.  An example of the price can be seen in the UK 
government’s Hostile Environment Policy of 2012, since rebranded as a Compliant 
Environment Policy, the aim of which has been to make the UK as unappealing as 
possible to those without valid leave to remain status.  The policy was the name 
given to a set of immigration-like regulations embedded into the laws and policies 
governing domestic social life in the UK, including in housing, education, health care 
and other basic human services. (UK Parliament, 2018; Liberty, 2018) The policy, its 
aggressive name and its modus operandi of deterring people from wanting to move 
to or remain in the UK by excluding them in some cases to the point of destitution, 
severe ill-health and family breakdown, is virtually the opposite of a humanitarian-
centric approach to immigration and asylum policy.  The policy exacerbates the 
violence of bordering, and results in what Sarah Keenan refers to as ‘a border in 
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every street’ (Keenan 2017).  This heavy price of bordering, then, is not only the 
moral cost that we bear in the global North, but it demonstrates that if there is a 
refugee crisis, we have co-designed it—this gradual and quotidian grinding of human 
lives (see also Bruce-Jones 2018). 
 
In International Migration and Global Justice, Satvinder Juss offers several critiques 
of Neve and Hathaway’s significant article on burden sharing.  These critiques 
centrally ask the question of whether Neve and Hathaway’s idea of what burden 
sharing should look like is morally defensible on that basis that it promotes the 
marketisation of racial and religious preferences (2006: 229–30) and allows for 
states to contract out of their responsibilities precisely because the narrow 
conception of the burden of migration is commoditised (2006: 226).  Juss also 
suggests, in his analysis, that refugee law should be incorporated into larger 
frameworks of immigration law and human rights law in order to re-orient the 
welfare of the refugee into the central reasoning behind programmes of 
international co-operation (2006: 245–46).   
 
Alongside the numerous operational and practical criticisms that Juss levies against 
the important proposal by Hathaway and Neve, he offers an important framework 
critique that is worthy of particular note.  This is the idea that it is impossible, and in 
Juss’ words, impracticable, to distinguish between the fiscal ‘burdens’ and the 
human ‘responsibilities’ that must be shared (ibid).  He notes that Hathaway and 
Neve presume different modes of analyzing the fiscal and human (and human-rights 
oriented) issues in the context of international co-operation on asylum. In my view, 
such an approach would fail to adequately apprehend the complexity of the issue, 
since, as we have seen with the EU-Turkey deal, the apportionment of fiscal costs 
has real and immediate impacts on human rights and real people’s lives.     
 
An extension of the market rationale of burden sharing is the idea of capacity- 
generation in receiving states.  The idea is that, as space and resources are limited, 
states ‘must facilitate repatriation to regenerate asylum capacity’ (Hathaway and 
Neve 1997: 172).  This implies that states must effectively put limits on refugee 
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protection now to ensure the ability to protect later, creating a sustainable 
environment for cycles of movement across borders.  This type of pragmatism seeks, 
at its best, to make the most of the economy of refugee protection by optimizing the 
potential of the system to ‘generate capacity’ for the cycles of movement.  However, 
a clear critique of the assumption that capacity is scarce is that, as a market 
rationale, capacity is not the issue, but rather the fear of swamping is the issue.  The 
issue is the fear that movement is limitless, that the West is desirable and that 
heightened rates of immigration pose an existential threat to the cultural integrity of 
receiving states.  The issue, then, is potentially as social as it is financial, and this 
further demonstrates the inability to extract fiscal from the human and social issues. 
 
Harsha Walia shows us that, beyond the interrelatedness between fiscal policies and 
lived realities, there is also a relationship between historical and geopolitical 
formations of power and the systematic subjugation of groups of people. In Border 
Imperialism, Walia describes how Western regimes “create mass displacement” and 
deploy border controls within their territories against those on the move as a result 
of the “ravages of capital and military occupations” (Walia 2017: 5; see also Rodney, 
1973).  She argues that, in this way, and with a view toward colonial relations, 
Western borders have generated “cycles of mass displacement.” (Walia, 2017; 5; see 
also Sharpe 2016).  Compare this view to the fundamentally different idea 
promulgated in contemporary refugee policy which would understand ‘push factors’ 
to mean economic, social and political turmoil that is understood to be historically 
and geographically endemic to the global south, rendered in public discourse in 
isolation to the trans-historical legacy of Western colonialism; equally, compare this 
to the concept of ‘pull factors,’ a term used in immigration reform around the UK 
Hostile Environment Policy to describe the allure of living in the UK, which some 
argue has overshadowed the reality of fleeing persecution in the popular focus on 
so-called illegal immigration (Hamwee 2016).  Walia and others note that the 
investment in borders in Western states is a project that involves policies of policing, 
deportation and systemic disenfranchisement that fuels movement in multiple 
directions, and this ‘cycle’ is not a tangential but a central part of the dynamic 
between border thinking and migration of vulnerable populations (Mezzadra 2013). 
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The external border of the European Union is a contemporary example of co-
operation along international borders that leads to sharpened forms of violence in 
the service of imperial formations.  The European Union’s external border is 
managed by member states that contribute to Frontex, the European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624), which exists as a way to secure 
the external border of Europe under the Community Border Code.  In some ways, 
Frontex represents the apex of burden sharing in a conventional sense—given the 
five guiding aspects of legal obligation, market discourse, border securitisation, crisis 
management and international solidarity.  However, it has operated mainly in a 
space that, in the context of asylum law, has synonymous with the constant and 
deadly peril of the Mediterranean Sea.  The humanitarian assistance of the European 
Border Agency, while it has improved in recent years, is insufficient because of the 
competing aim of securing the external border and owing to a failure for co-
operative efforts to be oriented towards the larger picture of the violence faced by 
refugees whilst on the move and at the border.   
 
 
It bears considering that, alongside pragmatic policies that attempt to address the 
failures of contemporary burden- or responsibility sharing approaches in the global 
North, we must think creatively about the limits of current regimes of international 
migration and border-thinking that generates the extreme precarity of people on the 
move.  In re-evaluating the ethics of burden sharing and contemplating a shift from 
inefficient co-operation to more co-operation of better quality and effectiveness, we 
must also think about what we understand the aims and content of the co-operation 
to be and what the burden is before we can reliably ascertain by what standard our 
approaches can be deemed ethically sound. 
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